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latter case, the landlord is not relieved of all responsibility, be-
cause he is still liable for vices and defects in parts of premises
not leased, in common areas, for injuries caused by his own neg-
ligence, and for injuries involving defects which he knew or
should have known of.
A lessor who is not the owner of leased premises guarantees
the lessee against vices in the property. The language of Article
2695 containing this warranty has been followed in limiting it
to the lessee alone. This warranty to a sub-lessee, it seems, may
be dispensed with by the sub-lessee assuming responsibility.
However, it remains to be seen how a third person will be af-
fected thereby.
Ben R. Miller, Jr.
Real Actions To Determine Ownership or Possession
Under the Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
Under present Louisiana law, rights of ownership and pos-
session of immovables are asserted in four principal real ac-
tions.' The petitory action and the possessory action are pro-
vided for expressly in the Code of Practice ;2 the action of jacti-
tation is a creature of jurisprudence ;3 and the action to establish
title was created by statute.4 Firmly embraced within this group
of actions is the fundamental civilian distinction between an
action to determine possession and an action to determine owner-
ship. Which action a litigant should employ depends essentially
upon whether he or the opposing litigant, or neither, is in pos-
session of the contested immovable.
Because of the inflexibility of the present real actions and the
technical manner in which the rules applicable thereto have been
applied by the courts, they have been criticized as hypertechnical
and unworkable. 5 The Louisiana State Law Institute was in-
1. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 4 (1870) : "A real action is that which relates
to claims made on immovable property, or to the immovable rights to which they
are subjected .. "
For a comprehensive treatment of present real actions in Louisiana, see
JOHNSON, LOUISIANA REAL ACTIONS (1959).
2. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 5, 43 (petitory action) ; 6, 46 (possessory ac-
tion) (1870).
3. Riley v. Kaempfer, 175 So. 884, 886 (La. App. 1937) : "A jactitation or
slander of title action is a creature of our jurisprudence. It is not provided for in
the codal or statutory laws of this state."
4. LA. R.S. 13:5062 (1950), formerly La. Acts 1908, No. 38.
5. Comment, The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22 TuL. L. REv. 459 (1948).
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structed by the legislature in 1948 to prepare a comprehensive
projet for the revision of the Louisiana Code of Practice. 6 Actual
work by the Law Institute pursuant to this legislative mandate
commenced late in 1950 and is now ready for legislative consid-
eration. Among the myriad of changes encompassed by the pro-
posed Code of Civil Procedure are rules which will greatly mod-
ify the system of real actions now prevailing. The purpose and
scope of this Comment is to conduct a brief survey of the pres-
ent real actions to determine ownership and possession, and to
examine the impact that the more important changes in the pro-
posed code will exert on these actions.
Petitory Action Under Present Law
The petitory action is brought by one out of possession who is
alleging ownership of an immovable, or of a real right, against
another in possession, in order to determine ownership. 7 The
plaintiff must allege in his petition: (1) that he is the owner of
the immovable or real right ;s and (2) that the defendant has the
actual possession of the property.9 The petition must include a
proper description of the property 10 and conclude with the pray-
er that plaintiff be recognized as the owner of the property and
that the opposing litigant be ordered to deliver possession to
him." It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove, every fact
necessary to establish title in himself, for his action rests essen-
6. La. Acts 1948, No. 335.
7. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 5 (1870) : "The petitory action is that by which
he who has the property of a real estate, or of a right upon or growing out of it,
proceeds against the person having the possession, in order to obtain the possession
of the immovable property, or the enjoyment of the rights upon it, to which he is
entitled."
8. Haas v. Irion, 125 La. 1034, 52 So. 149 (1910) ; Edwards Co. v. Dunning-
ton, 58 So.2d 225 (La. App. 1952).
9. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 5, 43 (1870) ; Thurman v. Hogg, 225 La. 263,
72 So.2d 500 (1954) ; Whalen v. Davis, 200 La. 1066, 9 So.2d 424 (1942);
Allison v. Maroun, 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408 (1939) ; Cherami v. Cantrelle, 174
La. 995, 142 So. 150 (1932); Bossier's Heirs v. Jackson, 114 La. 707, 38 So.
525 (1905); Girard's Heirs v. New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 295 (1858) Dreux v.
Kennedy, 12 Rob. 489 (La. 1846) ; Henderson v. Graham, 199 So. 439 (La. App.
1940).
10. Pittman v. Gulf Refining Co., 141 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1944) Wood v.
Mayo, 230 La. 389, 88 So.2d 705 (1956); Cupples v. Harris, 202 La. 336, 1J.
So.2d 609 (1942) ; Daigle v. Calcasieu Nat. Bank, 200 La. 1006, 9 So.2d 394(1942) ; Harrill v. Pitts, 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940) ; Smith v. Chappell,
177 La. 311, 148 So. 242 (1933) ; Ducre v. Milner, 165 La. 433, 115 So. 646(1928) ; Bayard v. Baldwin Lbr. Co., 157 La. 994, 1.03 So. 290 (1925) ; Wilfert
v. Duson, 131 La. 21, 58 So. 1019 (1912).
11. Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242 (1933) ; Ramos Lbr. & Mfg.
Co. v. Labarre, 116 La. 559, 40 So. 898 (1905) ; Young v. Anderson, 43 So.2d 280(La. App. 1949) ; A. J. Hodges Ind. v. Fobbs, 39 So.2d 91 (La. App. 1949).
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tially on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of
his opponent's.12 However, if the defendant has possession with-
out a title translative of ownership., the plaintiff need only estab-
lish a superior title in himself, as against the possessor.1' Should
the plaintiff fail to allege that the defendant is in actual posses-
sion, an exception of no cause of action will be sustained and the
suit dismissed. Dismissal of the suit will result also if, on the
trial on the merits, the plaintiff is unable to prove his allega-
tions of possession. 14 If no exception is tendered, the defendant
must file an answer; and the usual issue made by the answer is
that of title. Then, the court will decide on the merits whether
the plaintiff will prevail in his claim to the immovable or real
right in dispute.
Action To Establish Title Under Present Law
The action to establish title to real estate is a litigant's rem-
edy against an adverse claimant where neither is in actual pos-
session and both claim by recorded title. 15 , The petition must
allege the following: (1) that neither claimant is in actual pos-
12. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 44 (1870): "The plaintiff in an action of
revendication must make out his title, otherwise the possessor, whoever he be,
shall be discharged from the demand." Blevins v. Manufacturer's Record Publish-
ing Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So.2d 392 (1958); Collins v. Sun Oil Co., 223 La.
1094, 68 So.2d 184 (1953) ; Dugas v. Powell, 197 La. 409, 1 So.2d 677 (1941) ;
Chachere v. Superior Oil Co., 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939); Cook v. Martin,
188 La. 1063, 178 So. 881 (1938) ; Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242
(1933); Verdun v. Gilmore, 128 La. 1063, 55 So. 675 (1911); Millaudon v.
Ranney, 18 La. Ann. 196 (1866) ; DeVille v. Robertson, 108 So.2d 681 (La. App.
1959); Simmons v. Jones, 68 So.2d 663 (La. App. 1953); Edwards Co. v.
Dunnington, 58 So.2d 225 (La. App. 1952); Niette v. Stringfellow, 3 So.2d 911
(La. App. 1941).
13. Hutton v. Adkins, 186 So. 908 (La. App. 1939) ; Peters v. Crawford, 185
So. 716 (La. App. 1939) ; Griggs v. Martin, 170 So. 355 (La. App. 1936) ; Mower
v. Barrow, 16 La. App. 227, 133 So. 782 (1931); Zeringue v. Williams, 15 La.
Ann. 76 (1860).
14. As to plaintiff's failure to allege or prove possession in the defendant, see
Cherami v. Cantrelle, 174 La. 995, 142 So. 150 (1932); Girard's Heirs v. New
Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 295 (1858); Barnes v. Gaines, 5 Rob. 314 (La. 1843);
Brown v. Mayfield, 45 So.2d 912 (La. App. 1950) ; A. J. Hodges Ind. v. Fobbs,
39 So.2d 91 (La. App. 1949).
15. LA. R.S. 13:5062 (1950): "In all cases where two or more persons lay
claim to land by recorded title and where neither of the claimants are in the
actual possession of the land so claimed, either of the claimants may bring suit
against one or all the adverse claimants, and for that purpose may join one or
more adverse claimants in the same suit as defendants, to have the titles to the
land adjudicated upon by the court having jurisdiction of the property. It shall
not be necessary for the plaintiff to allege or prove possession in himself or the
defendants. This action shall be known as the action to establish title to real
estate. The judge shall decide which of the claimants are the owners of the
land in dispute, provided such judgment shall in no case be res adjudicata as to
persons not made parties to the suit."
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session;l6 (2) that both parties claim under recorded titles; I"
and (3) that the defendant is asserting an adverse claim.1 s The
petition must also include a proper description of the property."
The legislature in creating the action to establish title apparent-
ly intended that the court would weigh the competing claims of
ownership and that the plaintiff would have only the burden of
proving a title better than that of his opponent.2° However, the
more recent cases appear to hold that the plaintiff has the same
burden of proving valid title as is imposed upon a plaintiff in
the petitory action.2 1 For this reason, these decisions have been
criticized as erroneous.2
The Broadened Petitary Action Under Proposed Code
Article 3651 of the proposed Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vides:
"The petitory action is one brought by a person who
claims the ownership, but who is not in possession, of im-
movable property or of a real right, against another who is
16. Duffoure v. Constantin, 189 La. 826, 181 So. 183 (1938) ; Long v. Chailan,
187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937) ; Aaron v. Pitts, 186 La. 116, 171 So. 713 (1936) ;
Charnley v. Edenborn, 163 La. 945, 113 So. 156 (1927) ; Doiron v. Vacuum Oil
Co., 164 La. 15, 113 So. 748 (1927) ; Griffing v. Taft, 151 La. 442, 91 So. 832
(1922) ; City of Baltimore v. Lutcher, 135 La. 873, 66 So. 253 (1914) ; McHugh
v. Albert Hanson Lbr. Co., 129 La. 680, 56 So. 636 (1911) ; Henry v. Radiscish,
86 So.2d 635 (La. App. 1956) ; Ducron v. Couret, 82 So.2d 782 (La. App. 1955) ;
Doll v. Dearie, 41 So.2d 84 (La. App. 1949) ; Blanchard v. Martel, 146 go. 480
(La. App. 1933); Duson v. Hunsicker, 9 La. App. 657, 120 So. 86 (1929);
Wilson v. Ferguson, 6 La. App. 536 (1927) ; Bodcaw Lbr. Co.. v. The Pardee
Co., 3 La. App. 162 (1925).
17. Charnley v. Edenborn, 163 La. 945, 113 So. 156 (1927) ; Fortner's Heirs
v. Good Pine Lbr. Co., 146 La. 11, 83 So. 319 (1919) ; Blum v. Allen, 145 La.
71, 81 So. 760 (1919) ; City of Baltimore v. Lutcher, 135 La. 873, 66 So. 253
(1914) ; Blanchard v. Martel, 146 So. 480 (La. App. 1933) ; Schoultz v. Keller,
7 La. App. 575 (1928).
18. MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTIcE 266, n. 15.1 (1956 Supp.); Fried v.
Edmiston, 218 La. 522, 50 So.2d 19 (1951).
19. Long v. Chailan, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937) ; Charnley v. Edenborn,
163 La. 945, 113 So. 156 (1927) ; City of Baltimore v. Lutcher, 135 La. 873, 66
So. 253 (1914).
20. Doiron v. Vacuum Oil Co., 164 La. 15, 113 So. 748 (1927) ; Ellis v. Lou-
isiana Planting Co., 146 La. 652, 83 So. 885 (1920) ; Board of Com'rs v. Con-
cordia Land & Timber Co., 141 La. 247, 74 So. 921 (1917) ; Metcalf v. Green,
140 La. 950, 74 So. 261 (1916) ; City of Baltimore v. Lutcher, 135 La. 873, 66
So. 253 (1914) ; In re St. Vincent de Paul Benev. Ass'n of New Orleans, 175 So.
140 (La. App. 1937) ; Quaker Realty Co. Praying for Confirmation of Title,
10 Orl. App. 79 (La. App. 1914). See also MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE
266-67, n. 15.1 (1956 Supp.) ; Note, 18 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 360 (1958).
21. Albritton v. Childers, 225 La. 900, 74 So.2d 156 (1954) ; Stockstill v.
Choctaw Towing Corp., 224 La. 473, 70 So.2d 93 (1953) ; Dugas v. Powell, 197
La. 409, 1 So.2d 677 (1941) ; Thomas & Bullis v. Stricker Land & Timber Co.,
181 La. 784, 160 So. 413 (1935) ; Properties, Inc. v. Beckman, 77 So.2d 161 (La.
App. 1954).
22. McMahon, Louisiana Practice 266-67, n. 15.1 (1956 Supp.); Note, 18
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in possession or who claims the ownership thereof adversely,
to obtain judgment recognizing the plaintiff's ownership."
(Emphasis added.)
This article will effect a drastic change in the procedural law
by combining the petitory action and the action to establish
title. Frequently the plaintiff in a petitiory action or action to
establish title may not be certain whether the defendant is in
possession or not. Such a situation obtains because possession
is not solely a matter of fact but is frequently a matter that
can be determined only by the application of principles of law
that are themselves obscure.2z To preclude dismissal of his suit
in the event that he is mistaken about the defendant's posses-
sion, or lack of it, the plaintiff is forced to urge both actions
alternatively.24 The necessity for this procedure will be elimi-
nated under the broadened petitory action which may be
brought by the non-possessor against: (1) a person claiming
ownership and in possession; (2) a person in possession who
may not be asserting any adverse claim of ownership; or (3)
a person claiming ownership and out of possession. In the case
where the pleadings raise an issue as to the defendant's posses-
sion, this issue will have to be determined on the trial of the
case on its merits.
The defendant's possession, or lack of it, will determine the
burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff under Article 3653 of
the proposed procedural code which provides:
"To obtain judgment recognizing his ownership of the
immovable property or real right, the plaintiff in a petitory
action shall:
"(1) Make out his title thereto, if the court finds that
the defendant is in possession thereof ; or
"(2) Prove a better title thereto than the defendant, if
the court finds that the latter is not in possession thereof."
LoUISI.ANA LAW REVIEW 360 (1958) ; Comment, 29 TUL. L. REV. 617 (1955);
Comment, 13 TUL. L. REV. 434 (1939).
23. See Comments, 20 TUL. L. REV. 524 (1946) ; 12 TUL. L. REV. 608 (1938).
24. A cause of action under La. Acts 1908, No. 38, was pleaded alternatively
with the petitory action in the following cases: Thomas & Bullis v. Stricker Land
& Timber Co., 181 La. 784, 160 So. 413 (1935) ; Crichton v. Krouse, 142 So. 635
(La. App. 1932). See also Carbajal v. Leopold Weil Building & Improvement
Co., 146 La. 342, 83 So. 645 (1920) ; and Blocker v. Continental Securities Corp.,
157 So. 155 (La. App. 1934), where the plaintiff urged the jactitory action and
the action to establish title alternatively because of being uncertain of his own
possession.
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Under virtually every system of law, the lawful possessor is
entitled to remain in possession until he who asserts ownership
proves his title.2 5  Thus, possession determines the burden of
proof. This is also the criterion which governs the imposition
of the burden of proof in the present petitory, possessory, and
jactitory actions. Under these actions, the claimant disturbing
one in possession or asserting his ownership rights against one
in possession must carry the burden of proof. It would appear,
therefore, that where neither party is in possession, no necessity
exists for the plaintiff to shoulder the burden of proving a valid
title. This is the view embraced by the proposed procedural
code; and where the defendant is not in possession, both titles
are at issue and the better will prevail. Article 3653, therefore,
will work a legislative overruling of recent jurisprudence26
which has placed upon the plaintiff in an action to establish
title the same burden of proving a valid title as is imposed upon
a plaintiff in the petitory action where the defendant is ad-
mittedly in possession.
The proper party defendant under the proposed petitory
action is the adverse claimant of ownership, or, if there is no
adverse claim, the person in possession. There is no require-
ment that the action be brought against the tenant, as required
under Article 43 of the Code of Practice,27 since the tenant does
not possess for himself but only for his lessor.28 Article 43 not
25. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 29 (2d ed.
1899). See also BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 62
(1952).
26. See note 21 supra.
27. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 43 (1870): "The petitory action, or one by
which real property, or any immovable right to such property may be subjected,
is claimed, must be brought against the person who is in the actual possession
of the immovable, even if the person having the possession be only the farmer or
lessee.
"But if the farmer or lessee of a real estate be sued for that cause of action,
he must declare to the plaintiff the name and the residence of his lessor, who shall
be made a party to the suit, if he reside in the State, or is represented therein,
and who must defend it in, the place of the tenant, who shall be discharged from
the suit."
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3441 (1870) : "Those who possess, not for themselves,
but in the name of another, as farmers, depositaries and others who acknowledge
an owner, can not acquire, the legal possession, because, at the commencement of
their possession, they had not the intention of possession for themselves but for
another."
Id. art. 3433: "One may possess a thing not only by one's self, but also by
other persons.
"Thus the proprietor of a house or other tenement possesses by his tenant, or
by his farmer; the minor, by his tutor; and, in general, every proprietor, by the
persons who hold the thing in his name."
I. art. 3438: "One may acquire possession of a thing, not only by himself, but
also through others who receive it for him and in his name. But in this case it is
19591
98 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
only runs counter to civilian theory but is anachronistic as well.
2 9
Today, with the conveyance records in each parish in relatively
good order, it is not difficult to ascertain who is the adverse
claimant of ownership; and even where there is no adverse
claim to ownership but only adverse possession, it is not dif-
ficult to determine who is in possession. However, the new
procedure is sufficiently flexible to permit the plaintiff, in his
discretion, to join the tenant as a co-defendant.30 If the tenant
has a long-term lease, the plaintiff more than likely will desire
to have his right of ownership established against the adverse
claimant and his right to the: possession established against the
tenant in the same suit.
Possessory Action Under Present Law
The function of the possessory action3' is to give the posses-
sor of immovable property, or of a real right, a legal remedy to
aid in maintaining his possession or being restored to possession
when there has been either a disturbance in fact or a disturbance
in law.3 2 A disturbance in fact results from any act by another
which presents a physical obstacle to the enjoyment of posses-
necessary that the person receiving the possession should have had intention of
receiving for the other."
29. Cf. Lawrence v. Sun Oil Co., 166 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1948).
30. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 3652, para. 2: "A lessee
or other person who occupies the immovable property or enjoys the real right
under an agreement with the person who claims the ownership thereof adversely
to the plaintiff may be joined in the action as a defendant."
31. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 6 (1870) : "A possessory action is that by
which one claims to be maintained in the possession of an immovable property,
or of a right upon or growing out of it, when he has been disturbed; or to be
reinstated to that possession, when he has been divested or evicted."
Id. art. 46: "The possessory action, which is a branch of real actions, may be
brought by any possessor of a real estate, or of a real right, who is disturbed
either in the possession of the estate or in the enjoyment of the right, against him
who causes the disturbance, in order to be maintained in, or restored to the pos-
session, whether he has been evicted or disturbed; provided his possession be ac-
companied by the qualifications hereafter required."
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3454(2) (1.870) : "Rights which are common to all pos-
sessors in good or bad faith, are: 2. That every person who has possessed an
estate for a year, or enjoys peaceably and without interruption a real right, and
is disturbed in it, has an action against the disturber, either to be maintained in
his possession, or to be restored to it, in case of eviction, whether by force or
otherwise."Id. art. 3455: "The action which a possessor for one year has against a person
disturbing his possession, to be maintained in it or restored to it, as is said in
the preceding article, shall be decided before pronouncing on the question of owner-
ship, and the real owner shall not be allowed to repel it by endeavoring to prove
his right."
32. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 49(3) (1870) : "In order that the possessor of
a real estate, or one who claims a right to which such estate may be subjected,
may be entitled to bring a possessory action, it is required: . . . (3) That he
should have suffered a real disturbance either in fact or in law. . .."
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sion.33 A disturbance in law is more narrow and takes place
only when one, pretending to be the true possessor, alleges that
he is disturbed by the real possessor and brings the possessory
action against him. The true possessor in such a case is dis-
turbed by this action and is granted the right to counter with a
possessory action in his own name for the purpose of quieting
his possession.14 However, it is likely that the real possessor in
such a case will merely defend the suit brought against him, and,
by proving possession in himself, will have the suit dismissed.35
Therefore, as a practical matter, the possessory action is predi-
cated on a disturbance in fact. The plaintiff in the possessory
action must include the following allegations in his petition:
(1) that the plaintiff possesses as owner;36 (2) that he has had
actual possession, quietly and uninterruptedly, for more than a
year previous to the disturbance, and that this possession existed
at the instant when the disturbance occurred ;37 and (3) that
there has been a real disturbance of possession a.3  The petition
must contain also a proper description of the property 9 and
would allege that less than one year has elapsed since the dis-
33. Id. art. 51: "Disturbance in fact occurs when one by any act, prevents the
possessor of a real estate, or of a right growing from such estate, from enjoying
the same quietly, or throws any obstacle in the way of that enjoyment, or evicts
him through violence, or otherwise."
34. Id. art. 52: "Disturbance in law takes place when one, pretending to be
the possessor of a real estate, says that he is disturbed by the real possessor,
and brings against the latter the possessory action; for in such a case the true
possessor is disturbed by this action, and may also bring a possessory action in
order to be quieted in his possession.
"But in no case shall the mere demand in revendication of a real estate, or
of a real right, be considered as a disturbance in the enjoyment of a possessor,
and entitle him to bring a possessory action."
35. Crowell & Spencer Lbr. Co. v. Duplissey, 130 La. 837, 58 So. 590 (1912).
36. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 47 (1870) : "The possessors entitled to bring
these actions are those who possess as owners.
"Persons entitled to the usufruct or to the use of a real estate, and others
having real rights growing from such real estate, may also bring their action,
when disturbed in the enjoyment of their rights."
37. Id. art. 49(1-2) (1870) : "In order that the possessor of a real estate or
one who claims a right to which such estate may be subjected, may be entitled to
bring a possessory action, it is required: 1. That he should have had the real and
actual possession of the property at the instant when the disturbance occurred; a
mere civil or legal possession is not sufficient;
"2. That he should have had that possession quietly and without interruption,
by virtue of one of the titles prescribed in the forty-seventh article, for more than
a year previous to his being disturbed; provided the possession of less than one
year be sufficient, in case the possessor should have been evicted by force or by
fraud."
38. See note 32 supra.
39. Wright v. Holder, 72 So.2d 529 (La. App. 1954) ; Bossier Enterprises v.
Carbone, 66 So.2d 521 (La. App. 1953) ; Neal v. Farm Development Corp., 42
So.2d 319 (La. App. 1949) ; Loper v. White, 1 La. App. 695 (1925) ; McDonough
v. Childress, 15 La. 556 (1840).
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turbance. 40 If the plaintiff succeeds in proving his allegations,
his right of possession is protected regardless of whether he is
the legal owner in possession, or a mere usurper.4' The action
has been criticized 42 because the defendant is prevented, with-
out the plaintiff's consent, from changing the action into a
petitory action to determine ownership. As a result, the de-
fendant, who may be the lawful owner, is forced to bring a
petitory action in a separate suit against the possessor who may
actually be a trespasser. Without the plaintiff's consent, the
issue of ownership is left dangling.
Action of Jactitation Under Present Law
Under French law,43 from which Louisiana's possessory ac-
tion is taken, the possessory action was sufficiently broad to
cover both a disturbance in fact and a disturbance in law. How-
ever, the definition of disturbance in law under the Code of
Practice 44 is so narrow and confusing that it has been virtually
impossible to follow French law in the possessory action where
there has been anything other than a physical disturbance. In-
stead, Louisiana borrowed the jactitory action from Spanish
law 15 to cover the situation where there was a disturbance in
40. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 49(4) (1870) : "In order that the possessor of
a real estate, or one who claims a right to which such estate may be subjected,
may be entitled to bring a possessory action, it is required: ...
"4. That he should have brought his suit, at the latest, within the year in
which the disturbance took place."
Id. art. 59: "If one who is disturbed in or evicted from his possession, suffer
a year to elapse without bringing a possessory action, that action shall be pre-
scribed, and he must then resort to a petitory action."
LA. CiviL CODE art. 3456 (1870) : "But this, which is called the possessory
action, must be commenced by the possessor within a year, reckoning from the
time when he was disturbed; for if he leaves the person evicting him in pos-
session for one year, without complaint, he shall lose his possession, whatever ap-
parent right he may have had to it, and shall be driven to his action for the
ownership of the property."
41. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 49 (1870) :.....hen the possession of the
plaintiff is accompanied with all those circumstances, it matters not whether he
possesses in good or in bad faith, or even as a usurper, he shall nevertheless be
entitled to his possessory action."
42. Comment, 20 TUL. L. REV. 524 (1946).
43. CODE DE PROCtDURF CIVILE arts. 23-27 (France 1806).
44. See definition in note 34 supra.
45. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 3.2.46: "No person can be compelled, against his
will, to sue another, unless in certain particular cases, wherein the judge may,
by law, oblige him to do it. As where a man publicly says that another is his
slave, or defames him in presence of other persons. In these, and the like cases,
he who is defamed, may petition the judge of the place, to oblige the defamer to
bring a suit, and prove what he has said, or to retract, or to make such repara-
tions as the judge shall deem just. And if he be contumacious, and refuse to
institute his suit in obedience to the order of the judge, we say that party ag-
grieved shall be forever absolved from the clrge made against him, so that
neither the person defaming him, nor anyone cise for him, can thereafter sue him
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law. Under Spanish law, this action lay to prevent defamation
of person or property, whether movable or immovable. Louisi-
ana courts have limited the action to one protecting possession
where there is a defamation or disturbance in law involving
immovable property. The object of the action is to force the
defendant to desist from the slander, or to set forth his title in
the answer or in another suit.4" The slander may be any con-
ceivable claim prejudicial to the plaintiff's rights in immov-
able property. Physical acts47 as well as declarations made
orally,4" in writing,49 placed of record, or asserted in a pre-
vious unsuccessful suit,51 have given rise to the action; and it is
immaterial whether they are made to the plaintiff,52 or to other
persons.53 The action is founded exclusively on possession, is a
form of the possessory action, and is governed by the rules estab-
lished for the possessory action under present procedure, as far
as they are applicable. 54 There are, however, important differ-
on that account. And if such defamer afterwards repeat the same defamatory
language against the same person, the judge ought to punish him, so that by his
example others may be deterred from unjustly speaking ill of any one." See
Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart.(O.S.) 656 (La. 1821).
46. Young v. Town of Morgan City, 129 La. 339, 56 So. 303 (1911) ; Matthews
v. Slattery, 126 La. 120, 52 So. 238 (1910) ; Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355
(1883) ; Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 6.56 (La. 1821) ; Riley v. Kaemp-
fer, 175 So. 884 (La. App. 1937).
47. La Del. Oil Properties v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 La. 1137, 126
So. 684 (1930); Albert Hanson Lbr. Co. v. Mestayer. 130 La. 688, 58 So. 511
(1912) ; Chatellier v. Bradley, 57 So.2d 805 (La. App. 1952) ; Finch v. Schexnay-
der, 53 So.2d 484 (La. App. 1951).
48. Board of Trustees v. Rudy, 192 La. 200, 187 So. 549 (1939) ; Dalton v.
Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355 (1883) ; Packwood v. Dorsey, 4 La. Ann. 90 (1849) ;
Walden v. Peters, 2 Rob. 331 (La. 1842) ; Millaudon v. McDonough, 18 La. 102
(1841) ; Proctor v. Richardson, 11 La. 186 (1837) ; Livingston v. Heerman, 9
Mart.(O.S.) 656 (La. 1821).
49. Miami Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 218 La. 163, 48 So.2d 643 (1950)
Realty Operators v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So.2d 198 (1942)
Baird v. Atlas Oil Co., 146 La. 1091, 84 So. 366 (1920); Remick v. Lang, 47
La. Ann. 914, 17 So. 461 (1895); Jackson v. Davis, 49 So.2d 497 (La. App.
1950).
50. Ware v. Baucum, 221 La. 259, 59 So.2d 182 (1952) ; Roy 0. Martin Lbr.
Co. v. flodge-Hunt Lbr. Co., 190 La. 84, 181 So. 865 (1938) ; Rudd v. Land Co.,
188 La. 490, 177 So. 583 (1937) ; Meraux & Nunez v. Gaidry, 171 La. 852, 132
So. 401 (1931) ; Cepro v. Matulich, 152 La. 1072, 95 So. 226 (1923) ; Atchafalaya
Land Co. v. Brownell-Drews Lbr. Co., 130 La. 657, 58 So. 500 (1912) ; Teddlie v.
Riser, 121 La. 666, 46 So. 688 (1908) Patterson v. Landru, 112 La. 1069, 36
So. 857 (1904) ; Handlin v. Dodt, 110 La. 936, 34 So. 881 (1903); Boyet v.
Brushwood Methodist Church, 98 So.2d 593 (La. App. 1957) ; Bickham v. Craw-
ford, 64 So.2d 11 (La. App. 1953); Green v. George, 37 So.2d 547 (La. App.
1948).
51. New Orleans Land Co. v. Slattery, 145 La. 256, 82 So. 215 (1919): Henry
v. Dufilho, 14 La. 48 (1839).
52. Henry v. Dufilho, 14 La. 48 (1839).
53. Proctor v. Richardson, 11 La. 186 (1837); Livingston v. Heerman, 9
Mart.(O.S.) 656 (La. 1821).
54. Green v. George, 213 La. 739, 35 So.2d 595 (1948) ; Chatellier v. Bradley,
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ences. The jactitory action does not require a physical disturb-
ance,5 5 and it is convertible into a petitory action without the
consent of the plaintiff.56 If the defendant does convert the ac-
tion, he, as the non-possessor, becomes the plaintiff in the peti-
tory proceeding and has the burden of proving every fact neces-
sary to establish title in himself.
57
The Broadened Possessory Action Under Proposed Code
The proposed Code of Civil Procedure provides for a posses-
sory action which is a consolidation of the present possessory
and jactitory actions, with the procedural rules currently ap-
plicable to the action of jactitation applicable to the broadened
possessory action. This merger is achieved by three distinct
changes in the law: (1) broadening the definition of disturbance
in law; (2) permitting the defendant to convert the suit into a
petitory action; and (3) broadening the judgment to be ren-
dered for the successful plaintiff.
A broadened definition of disturbance in law is embodied in
the third paragraph of Article 3659, which provides:
"A disturbance in law is the execution, recordation, reg-
istry, or continuing existence of record of any instrument
which asserts or implies a right of ownership or to the pos-
session of immovable property or of a real right, or any
claim or pretension of ownership or right to -the possession
thereof except in an action or proceeding, adversely to the
possessor of such property or right."
This new definition of disturbance in law will make it possible
for the proposed possessory action to perform the functions of
the present jactitory action. The effected change, therefore, will
57 So.2d 805 (La.. App. 1952) ; Ledet v. Ledet, 192 So. 551 (La. App. 1939)
Brashears v. Chandler, 1&3 So. 546 (La. App. 1938).
55. Jackson v. Davis, 49 So.2d 497 (La. App. 1950).
56. Crowell & Spencer Lbr. Co. v. Burns, 191 La. 733, 186 So. 85 (1939).
57. Parham v. Maxwell, 222 La. 149, 62 So.2d 255 (1952) ; Miami Corp. v.
State Mineral Board, 218 La. 163, 48 So.2d 643 (1950) Marks v. Collier, 216
La. 1, 43 So.2d 16 (1949) ; Frost Lbr. Industries v. Union Power Co., 182 La. 439,
162 So. 37 (1935) ; Arent v. Hunter, 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157 (1931) ; Mereaux
& Nunez v. Gaidry, 171 La. 852, 132 So. 401 (1931) ; Williams v. Horn, 170 La.
663, 129 So. 122 (1930) ; Federico v. Nunez, 168 La. 914, 123 So. 618 (1929)
Baird v. Atlas Oil Co., 146 La. 1091, 84 So. 366 (1920) ; Garrett v. Spratt, 131
La. 707, 60 So. 199 (1912) ; Poland v. Dreyfous, 48 La. Ann. 83, 18 So. 906
(1896) ; Remick v. Lang, 47 La. Ann. 914, 17 So. 461 (1895) ; Sully v. Spearing,
40 La. Ann. 558, 4 So. 489 (1888) ; Gay v. Ellis, 33 La. Ann. 249 (1881) ; Bid-
well v. Cavaroc and the Bank of New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 307 (1875) ; Havard
v. Atkins, 24 La. Ann. 511 (1872) ; Short v. Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal
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bring us closer to the position of the French law on the matter.58
Another change resulting from this article should also be ex-
amined. Presently, the institution of the possessory action is a
disturbance in law of the defendant's possession, if the latter
actually has possession. 59 Under the proposed article above it is
not. However, this will leave no hiatus in the new procedure,
for the defendant may reconvene and bring the possessory ac-
tion against the plaintiff, and obtain the same relief as if he had
filed a separate possessory action. The acts of possession on
which the original plaintiff relied to prove his possession would
constitute disturbances in fact; and any recorded title to the
plaintiff would constitute a disturbance in law, of the original
defendant's possession, if the latter actually had possession.
The second paragraph of Article 3657 of the proposed code
aids in implementing the merger of the two actions by provid-
ing:
"When . . . the defendant in a possessory action asserts
title in himself, in the alternative or otherwise, he thereby
converts the suit into a petitory action, and judicially con-
fesses the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory ac-
tion."
It is clear that this provision will make the procedural rule
presently applicable to the jactitory action applicable to the
broadened possessory action. It not only will permit the de-
fendant, at his option, to convert the suit into a petitory action
but also provides that he will do so whenever he injects the
issue of ownership in his answer. As a consequence of this
change, the issue of ownership in a possessory action will not
be left suspended if the defendant desires to raise the issue.
Therefore, the requirement of a separate suit by the defendant
in the possessory action to try title will be eliminated. It is per-
tinent to note that under the jactitory action, the defendant can
convert the suit into a petitory action through his answer,0 a
reconventional demand, 61 or a supplemental answer filed after
judgment ordering the defendant to institute the petitory ac-
Church South, 11 La. Ann. 174 (1856) ; Millaudon v. McDonough, 18 La. 102
(1841).
58. See note 43 supra.
59. See note 34 upra.
60. Board of Trustees of Ruston Circuit v. Rudy, 192 La. 200, 187 So. 549
(1939) ; Barrow v. LeBlanc, 35 So.2d 469 (La. App. 1948).
61. Carmody v. Land, 207 La. 625, 21 So.2d 764 (1945).
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tion. 62 It is apparently intended that the second paragraph of
Article 3657 will encompass all three of these methods of effect-
ing conversion. 63
The joining of the two actions is facilitated also by expand-
ing the judgment to be rendered for the successful plaintiff in
the broadened possessory action. Article 3662(2) of the pro-
posed code provides:
"A judgment rendered for the plaintiff in a possessory ac-
tion shall: ...
"(2) Order the defendant to assert his adverse claim
of ownership of the immovable property or real right in a
petitory action to be filed within a. delay to be fixed by the
court not to exceed sixty days after the date the judgment
becomes executory, or be precluded thereafter from assert-
ing the ownership thereof, if the plaintiff has prayed for
such relief."
Under present procedure, the relief provided in the preceding
article is made available only to the successful plaintiff in the
jactitory action. Therefore, a change will be made in the law
by granting the successful plaintiff in the broadened posses-
sory action such relief, notwithstanding the fact that the dis-
turbance complained of was of a physical nature. Of course, a
plaintiff may not wish to have the defendant ordered to in-
stitute a petitory action. However, the new provision is suf-
ficiently flexible to leave this matter to the election of the plain-
tiff. It is material to note that the last paragraph of this article
will assist greatly in expediting a definitive judgment in the
possessory action by limiting the period for a devolutive appeal
to thirty days. 4
Cumulation Of Actions Under Present Law
The possessory and petitory actions cannot be cumulated or
joined together except by consent of the parties.6 5 This rule is
intended to keep the trial of the issues of possession and owner-
ship as separate as possible. If the plaintiff in the possessory
62. Sherburne v. Iberville Land Co., 192 La. 1091, 190 So. 227 (1939).
63. See Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 3657, Comment (e).
64. See id. art. 3662: ". . . A suspensive appeal from the judgment rendered
in a possessory action may be taken within the delay provided in Article 2123
[15 days], and a devolutive appeal may be taken from such judgment only within
thirty days of the applicable date provided in Article 2087(1)-(3)."
6t. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 55 (1870).
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action consents to the defendant's injection of the petitory ac-
tion into the suit, the plaintiff is considered as having renounced
the possessory action. The court then decides only the question
of ownership. 66 If the plaintiff sues for both possession and
ownership of the property at the same time, he is considered as
having waived the possessory action in favor of the petitory
action. Furthermore, if the plaintiff brings a petitory action,
he cannot afterwards bring the possessory action.
6 7
Cumulation Of Actions Under Proposed Code
The first paragraph of Article 3657 of the proposed Code of
Civil Procedure provides:
"The plaintiff may not cumulate the petitory and the
possessory actions in the same suit or plead them in the
alternative, and when he does so he waives the possessory
action. If the plaintiff brings the possessory action, and
without dismissing it and prior to judgment therein insti-
tutes the petitory action, the possessory action is abated."
While the first sentence of the preceding article will make no
change in the law, the subsequent sentence will incorporate a
much needed one into a procedural area which is fraught with
technicality and rigidity. Presently, the penalty for the cumula-
tion of the two actions is the judicial confession of the possession
of the defendant.68 This result not only amounts to a waiver of
the possessory action, but makes it impossible for the plaintiff
to dismiss the suit, and later renew the possessory action alone
in the second suit. This seems too harsh a penalty when the
improper cumulation, or alternative pleading, of the two ac-
tions results from mere oversight or inadvertence of counsel.
Under the proposed procedure, where there is alternative plead-
ing or improper cumulation, the plaintiff may have the suit dis-
missed without prejudice- as of right, if application therefor
is made prior to a general appearance by the defendant ;69 or at
the discretion of the court, when application is made there-
after. 70  Then, the plaintiff may renew his possessory action
66. Id. art. 57.
67. Id. art. 54.
68. Williams' Heirs v. Zengel, 117 La. 599, 42 So. 153 (1906).
69. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1671: "A judgment dis-
missing an action without prejudice shall be rendered upon application of the
plaintiff and upon his payment of all costs, if the application is made prior to a
general appearance by the defendant. ... ."
70. Id. art. 1671: ". . . If the application is made after a general appearance,
the court may refuse to grant the judgment of dismissal except with prejudice."
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alone in a second suit without being barred by a judicial con-
fession of the possession of the defendant.
Although the plaintiff in the possessory action under Article
3657 does not judicially confess the possession of the defendant
by instituting the petitory action before judgment, the conclud-
ing paragraph of that article provides:
"If, before executory judgment in a possessory action,
the defendant therein institutes a petitory action in a sep-
arate suit against the plaintiff in the possessory action, the
plaintiff in the petitory action judicially confesses the pos-
session of the defendant therein." (Emphasis added.)
This provision will prevent a defendant in a possessory action
from defeating the efforts of the plaintiff in the possessory ac-
tion to have the issue of his possession adjudicated therein. It
also will prevent him from relitigating the issue in a petitory
action filed in a separate suit, and in which he would allege
that the defendant was not in possession. Thus, it is clear that
the rules of Article 3657 are intended to facilitate, as far as
possible, a separation of the issues of possession and ownership
and to encourage the resolution of the issue of possession before
the institution of the petitiory action.
Adjudication Of Rights To Property In Actions Othen Than
Real Actions
As a practical matter many issues of ownership of immov-
ables or real rights are involved and adjudicated in some so-
called fringe actions. For example, the concursus proceeding 71
is frequently invoked by mineral lessees holding leases from op-
posing claimants to the same tract of land. 72 The lessee deposits
funds into the registry of the court and cites the adverse claim-
ants to appear and assert their rights to the funds. In this
situation, since the ownership of the funds depends upon owner-
ship of the land, the claimants are required to litigate their
rights to the ownership of the land. In addition to the concursus
proceeding, the action for a declaratory judgment has been
71. LA. R.S. 13:4811-4817 (1950).
72. California Co. v. Price, 234 La. 338, 99 So.2d 743 (1957) Texas Co. v.
McDonald, 228 La. 353, 82 So.2d 37 (1955); California Co. v. Price, 225 La.
706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954); Placid Oil Co. v. George, 221 lia. 200, 59 So.2d 120
(1952); Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Applegate, 218 La. 572. 50 So.2d 197 (1950);
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Bonrd, 203 La. 473, 14 So.2d 61
(1943).
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utilized to adjudicate the ownership of land and mineral rights.7 3
However, it is not presently clear to what extent this action may
be employed to assert a claim to immovable property. Dicta in
the Burton v. Lester7 4 decision makes it dubious that the Declara-
tory Judgments Act 75 is appropriate where one of the traditional
actions would be available. However, all such doubt will be dis-
pelled by the proposed code 70 which provides that the existence
of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. It is also
possible that issues of ownership may be presented in expro-
priation and similar proceedings where adverse claimants of
ownership are urging conflicting claims to the compensation
to be paid for the taking of immovable property.
Without doubt, the most serious problem inherent in the
employment of these fringe actions to determine issues of owner-
ship is whether or not the highly important role played by pos-
session in the civil law of immovables will be impaired. Under
present law there is no guaranty to the possessor that the op-
posing claimant will be required to establish a perfect right as
the litigant out of possession would be required to do in the
petitory action. Adjudication of real rights to property in other
than the traditional real actions has been vigorously attacked as
offering "the claimant out of possession advantages that are
inconsistent with the prevailing system of real actions. ' 77 Cer-
tainly there would be no basis for this criticism if the action
were tried on the merits, giving full effect to the substantive and
73. Calhoun v. Gulf Refining Co., 235 La. 494, 104 So.2d 547 (1958) ; Smith
v. Smith, 230 La. 509, 89 So.2d 55 (1956) ; Parker v. Tillman, 228 La. 214, 81
So.2d 866 (1955); Bierhorst v. Kelly, 225 La. 934, 74 So.2d 168 (1954) ; La
Terre Co. v. Naquin, 225 La. 210, 72 So.2d 481 (1954) ; Horn v. Skelly Oil Co.,
224 La. 709, 70 So.2d 657 (1954) ; Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La.
868, 64 So.2d 202 (1953) ; Hastings v. McDowell, 75 So.2d 383 (La. App. 1954) ;
Levenson v. Chancellor, 68 So.2d 116 (La. App. 1953) ; Krokroskia v. Martin,
61 So.2d 630 (La. App. 1952).
74. 227 La. 347, 349, 79 So.2d 333, 335 (1954) : "[W]e do not believe that
the statute should be employed as a substitute for the well defined actions pro-
vided for in the Code of Practice or those which have been established by juris-
prudence unless, by reason of the special circumstances of the case, the codal
procedure does not furnish an adequate remedy."
75. LA. R.S. 13:4231-4246 (1950).
76. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1871: "Courts of record
within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status, and other legal
relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or pro-
ceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or
decree is prayed for; and the existence of another adequate remedy does not pre-
elude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The dec-
laration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree." (Emphasis
added.)
77. Comment, 29 TUL. L. REV. 617, 633 (1955).
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procedural rights accorded the possessor under the existing real
actions. This is distinctly provided for in Article 3654 of the
proposed code:
"When the issue of ownership of immovable property or
of a real right is presented in an action for a declaratory
judgment, or in a concursus, expropriation, or similar pro-
ceeding, or the issue of the ownership of funds deposited in
the registry of the court and which belong to the owner of
the immovable property or of a real right is so presented, the
court shall render judgment in favor of the party:
"(1) Who would be entitled to the possession of the im-
movable property or real right in a possessory action, unless
the adverse party makes out his title thereto; or
"(2) Who proves better title to the immovable property
or real right, when neither party would be entitled to the
possession of the immovable property or real right in a pos-
sessory action."
This article insures that possession will perform its historic role
of determining the burden of proof in all actions which actually
or indirectly adjudicate rights of ownership, although techni-
cally not classified as real actions. The possession required of a
plaintiff in a possessory action, employed as determinative of
the burden of proof, will prevent one of the parties from taking
possession of the property briefly prior to rendition of judg-
ment, or from dispossessing the rightful possessor, so as to
obtain the benefit of the rules as to burden of proof.
Summary and Conclusion
In summary, it may be observed that the proposed actions to
determine ownership or possession will introduce several im-
portant changes into our present procedural law. The petitory
action will be broadened to include both the present action of the
same name and the action to establish title, with possession of
the defendant merely determining the burden of proof to be
imposed upon the plaintiff. The possessory action will be ex-
panded so as to embrace both the present possessory action and
the jactitory action, with some of the procedural rules of the
latter made applicable to the proposed action. Also, new rules
will be incorporated into the law which will permit possession
to perform its time-honored role of determining the burden of
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proof in actions which directly or indirectly adjudicate rights
of ownership, although not categorized technically as real ac-
tions. Other changes of less importance, some of which have
not been treated in this Comment, are proposed so that the new
petitory and possessory actions will be better adapted to modern
conditions. It should be observed that the changes suggested in
this revision will effect simplification and liberalization in the
procedural law, yet accord with the civilian concepts of property
and possession, as well as with the basic principles on which
the present procedural law is predicated. It is submitted that
the adoption of this revision will do much to reduce the rigidity
of the present real actions and to preclude the hypertechnical
manner in which they have been applied.
Joseph W. Milner
Multiple Total and Permanent Disabilities in
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
The purpose of this Comment is to investigate two problems
of Louisiana Workmen's Compensation. The first of these is the
possibility of multiple total and permanent disabilities under
the act and the judicial interpretations thereof. The second is
the recovery which is or should be available to a worker so
disabled.
Successive Total and Permanent Disabilities
The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act provides that
"total disability" is inability to do work of any reasonable char-
acter.1 The Louisiana courts have interpreted this language as
meaning inability to perform work of the same or similar char-
acter as the employee is accustomed to performing.2 When the
1. LA. R.S. 23:1221 (1-2) (1950). The act allows 400 weeks of compensation
for total and permanent disability. The amount is set at 65% of wages within
the limits of $10 to $35. For temporary total disability compensation is recover-
able during the period of disability, not to exceed 300 weeks. For partial dis-
ability, compensation payments are set at 65% of the difference between the wages
received before the accident and those received afterwards. These benefits are re-
coverable during the period of disability, not to exceed 300 weeks. See id. 23:1202,
1221 (1-3). In addition to the disability provisions, the act provides compensa-
tion for certain permanent bodily impairments. The periods for which compensa-
tion is recoverable varies from ten weeks for the loss of a toe to 400 weeks for
the loss of both hands or both feet. See id. 23:1221(4).
2. See Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932)
Myers v. Jahncke Service Inc., 76 So.2d 436 (La. App. 1955) ; Strother: v. Stand-
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